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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is at issue in this appeal and is fully briefed* 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does this court have jurisdiction over this appeal when 
the notice of appeal was filed before a final order was issued by 
the trial court, and that final order disposed of what was arguably 
a Rule 59 motion? 
There is no applicable standard of review, as this Court 
considers its own jurisdiction originally. 
As to the merits, Reeves agree that this Court reviews all of 
the issues in this appeal de novo. Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P. 2d 
796, 802-03 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Reeves differ, however, with 
Steinfeldt's framing of the issues, and to the degree Reeves differ 
they would frame them as follows: 
2. Did the trial court correctly rule that Steinfeldt 
contractually bound himself as to when he could file a mechanics' 
lien, and that he breached that contract by filing prematurely? 
3. Did the trial court correctly rule that Steinfeldt could 
not "cure" his defective filing with a subsequent filing? 
4. Did the trial court correctly deny prejudgment interest to 
Steinfeldt? 
5. Did the trial court correctly deny Steinfeldt attorney 
fees? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 (attached sa Appendix 1). 
Other rules or statutes determinative of the appeal have been 
attached to the appellant's brief. 
I rATEMENT III 'I'M I < ASE 
The case has been properly stated by the appellant, with the 
exception that this Court must consider whether it has jurisdiction 
over t fie appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Steinfeldt has chosen to state the facts as gleaned from 
select portions of the record 1 his is inappropriate. He chooses 
to interpret the record—the task of the trial court—rather than 
restate the facts as found by the trial court. He does this 
notwithstanding the fact that he has leveled no challenge 
whatsoever to the court's findings. See Docketing Statement of 
Defendant-Appellant (no mention of a factual challenge or statement 
of a clearly erroneous standard of review). This Court should 
disregard his references to the record, inasmuch as Steinfeldt has 
not marshalled the evidence as required to make an evidentiary 
challenge. See In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989) . Reeves here restate the facts as found by the court (see R. 
265-61) -1 
1
 Part of this case was decided on summary judgment, which might 
suggest that the facts should be read in Steinfeldt's favor. However, 
the summary judgment only resolved whether the written contract between 
the parties was ambiguous, a legal task in any event. Thus, no factual 
challenges to the factual findings are before this Court. 
2 
Reeves owned property in Lindon, Utah, and Steinfeldt acted as 
the general contractor to build a home for Reeves on the property. 
After approximately the framing stage of construction, the parties 
discussed and reached a revised agreement dated August 9, 1993, as 
to Steinfeldt7s work in constructing the home. The agreement was 
reduced to writing and stated: 
At close of house, Thad Steinfeldt will be 
paid $10,000 which will be payment in full for 
labor and services concerning Shawn & Julie 
Reeves7 house at 53 W. 650 N. Lindon, Utah. 
This in addition to regular $300\week supervi 
sion fees and hourly wages of $20 approved in 
advance for any necessary changes. $14,000 
contractor fee in loan is null and void. 
S/ T.B. Steinfeldt 
S/ S.F. Reeves 
The agreement governed the method and time of Steinfeldt7s 
compensation. Steinfeldt failed to complete the work as promised, 
and Reeves were forced to procure substitute performance to 
complete the house. Reeves had made all payments to Steinfeldt 
required by their agreement through the date of the last draw in 
October, 1993. 
On November 5, 1993, Steinfeldt filed a lien against Reeves' 
property in the sum of $17,929. Because Steinfeldt had placed the 
lien on the property, Reeves were required to escrow 150% of the 
lien amounts in order to close their long-term financing. 
Steinfeldt amended the lien on or about December 22, 1993, reducing 
the claimed amount to $12,764.19, and a portion of the escrowed 
funds were released. Reeves7 damages were found to include labor 
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charges for Steinfeldt's replacement and interest on the extra 
escrow monies. 
After having filed an amended complaint, Reeves moved for 
partial summary judgment. The court granted Reeves' motion and 
ruled that the language of the written agreement of 1 august 9, 1993 
(1) voided any prior agreements between the parties; (2) was clear 
and unambiguous, and (3) it should be enforced as written. R. 196. 
After trial, the court concluded that while Steinfeldt was 
entitled to the benefit of the August 9 agreement, he had filed the 
lien in excess of his entitlement, and his filing was premature 
inasmuch as Steinfeldt was tc be paid at the time of closing and 
not sooner. R. 2 35, 3 07. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court lacks jurisdiction, Steinfeldt filed two 
motions after issuance of the trial court's memorandum decision. 
Steinfeldt then filed his notice of appeal before the trial court 
had disposed of those motions, thus the notice of appeal was 
premature and had no effect. The same is true for the extension 
for time to file a notice of appeal: one cannot extend the time to 
file something that cannot yet be filed. 
II. A mechanic's lien, like any other lien, requires both 
attachment and perfection. Attachment occurs automatically through 
the statute, but perfection requires filing by the lienor. The 
statute provides for a "window" of time when that perfection can 
occur. That window begins with the "substantial completion" of the 
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work and, under the statute in this case, ended eighty days later. 
The trial court made a correct and critical distinction between an 
agreement which would bar a lien entirely and an agreement which 
would determine the time from which the eighty-day window of 
opportunity would run. The trial court called the agreement a 
"limited lien waiver" because it affected the time when the lien 
could be filed. Under general principles of law, no lien may be 
properly filed until payment is due. Payment is normally due when 
the work is substantially complete and accepted by the owner, but 
when, as here, the payment due date is changed, the right to file 
a lien begins when payment is due and has not been made. It would 
be absurd to think that a contractor could file a lien to recover 
monies which were not yet due. 
Here the parties contracted as to the time for payment in a 
perfectly permissible way. Steinfeldt breached that contract by 
filing his lien prematurely and for an excessive amount. His 
subsequent filing of a second lien did not "cure" the original 
filing, as the statute does not contemplate such a "cure", and, in 
any event, the work had not yet been accepted by Reeves. 
III. Steinfeldt cannot recover attorney fees because he is 
not the prevailing party. There can be only one prevailing party 
under the statute, and the trial court deemed Reeves the prevailing 
party. 
IV. Steinfeldt may not recover prejudgment interest. 
Prejudgment interest is only available for those debts whose exact 
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amount is subject to determination by the factfinder. Here, the 
amount due Steinfeldt was disputed and eventually determined by the 
factfinder. Thus, no prejudgment interest may be awarded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Steinfeldt Filed His Notice of Appeal Prior To Disposition < :>f 
a Post-Trial Motion and, Therefore, This Court Has No 
Jurisdiction Over This Appeal. 
Before responding to Steinfeldt's substantive issues, Reeves 
must first raise a challeng .,.-•* arisdicti on. A 
jurisdictional argument can be raised at any time, even at oral 
argument. Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah, 889 P.2d 415 
(Utah 1994) . 
The challenge to jurisdiction is predicated on the timing of 
Steinfeldt's notice of appeal, which was filed before the trial 
court' s disposition of a Rule 59 motion. 1 \ chr onology of this 
case's docket is necessary to an understanding of the 
jurisdictional issues: 
1. September 12, 1994. Memorandum decision issued which 
Reeves' motion for partial summary judgment is granted, counsel to 
prepare an appropriate order. R. 196. 
2. October 17, 1994. Memorandum decision issued after trial 
in favor of Reeves. Reeves' counsel to prepare an appropriate 
order. R. 235. 
3. October 25, 1994. Steinfeldt's "Motion for 
Reconsideration" is filed. R. 238. 
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4. November 4, 1994. Judge Harding signs the Judgment and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 261, 266. 
5. November 8, 1994. Steinfeldt's Objection to Plaintiff's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed. R. 272. 
6. December 2, 1994. Judge Harding signs an Order granting 
Steinfeldt's ex parte motion for an extension of time to file 
notice of appeal. R. 296. 
7. December 8, 1994. Judge Harding issues a Memorandum 
Decision denying Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration. Reeves' 
counsel to submit an appropriate order. R. 298. 
8. December 27, 1994. Notice of appeal filed. R. 306. 
9. January 3, 1995. Judge Harding signs an Order disposing 
of Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and Objection. R. 3 07. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a notice 
of appeal filed while a Rule 59 motion is pending has no effect and 
does not take effect upon disposition of the motion. Here the 
motion for reconsideration and the objections to the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were treated by the trial court as Rule 
59 motions, and thus the ex parte extension of time to file a 
notice of appeal was ineffectual. 
In this case a "Motion for Reconsideration", brought 
ostensibly under Rule 54 (see R. 246 (supporting memorandum citing 
Ron Shepherd, a Rule 54 case)) , was filed after announcement of the 
trial court's decision but before the signing of the final order. 
However, when the court issued its final order on November 4, 1994, 
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it did so without disposing of the outstanding motion. Despite 
Steinfeldt's styling of his motion as a rule 54 motion, the court's 
December 17, 1994 Order removed any doubt that the court did not 
consider the motion to be a Rule 54 motion, but rather a Rule 59 
motion. The court did not dispose of the motion for 
reconsideration until after the December 17 Order had been signed. 
The Court, therefore, treated the motion as a Rule 59 motion. 
Even if the motion for reconsideration was not a Rule 59 
motion, Steinfeldt's "objection", filed four days after the entry 
of the court's November 4 Order, was clearly a Rule 59 motion. 
"Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion filed within ten days 
of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the 
court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-
judgment motion under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e)." Debry v. 
Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (emphasis supplied) ; see Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991); Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555, 557 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) . 
Given these facts, Steinfeldt could not have timely filed his 
notice of appeal until January 3, 1995, or within thirty days after 
that date. Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah, 889 P. 2d 415 
(Utah 1994).2 This result is unchanged notwithstanding Steinfeldt 
2
 This is true even considering Judge Harding,s granting of the 
extension of time to file the notice of appeal. The notice was 
ineffective given the pending post-judgment motion. Because Steinfeldt 
did not file a timely notice of appeal, his appeal must be dismissed. 
See U.R.A.P. 2 (provisions of Rule 4(b) may not be suspended). 
8 
not receiving actual notice that its motion may still have been 
pending. When a time period runs from the time of filing, actual 
notice is irrelevant. Since the court's docket is a public record, 
a party is always on constructive notice of a filing. Steinfeldt 
therefore knew from the contents of the Order that a motion was 
pending, and if he did not, he could have requested a clarification 
from the court or, more simply, filed his notice of appeal and then 
diligently checked with the clerk's office, every day if need be, 
to ensure that the court filed no further dispositive orders that 
could be treated as final. Notice of an order is not required for 
the time for filing a notice of appeal to accrue. See U.R.C.P. 
58A(d)("The prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and shall file 
proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. 
However, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by 
the notice requirements of this provision.")(emphasis supplied); 
Workman v. Nagle. 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
It was Steinfeldt's duty to determine whether the motions he 
filed may have been disposed of upon entry of what was styled a 
final order. When there is any doubt as to whether a motion 
remains outstanding, the party filing the motion has the burden of 
requesting a ruling or for an extension of the time to appeal. 
That is what this Court and the Supreme Court have required. See, 
e.g. , Swenson Associates Architects v. Utah, 889 P. 2d 415 (Utah 
1994) . Steinfeldt did not do this, and his appeal must be 
dismissed. 
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II. Steinfeldt Did Not "Waive" His Right To Pile a Mechanic's 
Lien, But Rather Contractually Fixed the Time For Filing a Lien, 
and Then Breached the Contract by Prematurely Filing. 
Steinfeldt argues that the trial Court found the August 9 
agreement to be a "waiver" of his right to file a mechanic's lien. 
The trial court did not so hold. Steinfeldt did not waive his 
right to file a lien: he simply contracted as to the time he could 
file a lien, and his right to file a lien was therefore only 
impaired in a limited fashion, if at all. Steinfeldt confuses his 
right to file a lien at all with his right to file a lien at a 
particular time. The statute prescribes both rights: one may file 
a lien, and one has a particular "window" of time in which to do 
so. Steinfeldt willingly defined the borders of that window by 
contract, but still retained the right to file a lien. 
A. Steinfeldt Did Not Waive His Right to File a Lien, 
But Rather Fixed the Date He Could File a Lien. 
The mechanic's lien statute applicable to this action states 
that "Each contractor or other person who claims benefits under 
this chapter within 80 days after substantial completion of the 
project or improvement shall file for record with the county 
recorder . . . a written notice to hold and claim a lien." Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-7 (1993). Steinfeldt contracted to fix the date 
on which he could file a lien—the closing date. Furthermore, the 
statute states that a lien may not be filed until after 
"substantial completion" of the project or improvement. 
Substantial completion obviously means "completion", as in all work 
being completed. Nagle v. Club Fountainbleu, 405 P.2d 346 (Utah 
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1965) (date of "completion11 disputed; date of completion was crucial 
date for commencing statutory period to file lien). But the date 
of "substantial completion" also means the date when only minor or 
trivial work remains to be accomplished, Interiors Contracting v. 
Smith, Halander & Smith, 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 771 P.2d 1100, 
1102 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 781 P. 2d 878 (Utah 1989). 
Furthermore, the requirements for filing a lien are not satisfied 
until the owner has accepted the lienor's work. Interiors 
Contracting, 827 P.2d at 965. 
The trial court correctly held that Steinfeldt breached the 
contract it made by prematurely filing a mechanic's lien before the 
closing date (the date of substantial completion) .3 The exact 
language of the trial court's ruling is significant. It ruled that 
the written agreement constituted a "limited lien waiver." The 
word "limited" is important. The court obviously doubted whether 
specifying the date of payment could constitute a "waiver" of the 
right to place a mechanics' lien. Steinfeldt ignores the 
limitation the court placed on the term "waiver", and spends much 
3
 Steinfeldt has also argued that by contractually fixing the 
date of payment at closing, a contractor could end up with no right of 
lien because closing occurred more than 90 days after "substantial 
completion." The term "substantial completion" is a benchmark, 
subject to judicial interpretation so that the statute makes sense. 
If, as here, the parties in Steinfeldt's hypothetical simply intend to 
fix a lien's time of perfection, then it offends reason to think that 
the term "substantial completion" would mean anything but closing. The 
parties can always contract for when "substantial completion" occurs. 
Here, that time was closing. 
11 
time discussing general waiver when general waiver was not really 
at issue ion this case.4 
4
 Reeves recognize that Steinfeldt has spent a great deal of time 
on this issue, and so addresses it here in a footnote. Even if the 
modification were deemed a "waiver", it was still binding. Steinfeldt 
suggests that the modification was improper in form (it was not 
"express"). However, all of the cases that Steinfeldt cites concern 
total waivers, not situations where one is simply proscribed from 
filing one's lien until a certain time and to a certain amount. 
Steinfeldt was free to file a lien within such parameters, and admits 
as much: "Steinfeldt, by agreement, was not going to be paid until the 
closing of the Reeves' home, and to protect such payment filed a notice 
of mechanic's lien . . . ." Brief of the Appellant at 13 (emphasis 
supplied). He never says he could not file a lien at the appropriate 
time. Steinfeldt argues that he is entitled, on public policy grounds, 
that because he is nervous about payment before completion of the 
house, he is entitled to file a lien. Such conduct is most assuredly 
against public policy and is an abuse of a statutory lien. 
Furthermore, no Utah authority speaks to whether waiving the right 
to file a mechanics' lien must be express in the sense that they must 
say "this a waiver of your lien." Steinfeldt has cited Utah authority 
that a waiver of lien must be clear and unambiguous, as any waiver 
must. The only mechanics' lien case he cites is Mine and Smelter 
Supply Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 471 P.2d 154 (Utah 1970), 
which is not in point: that case discussed an incredible latent 
ambiguity (the work performed could not enjoy a lien because the work 
was on a public building). Here the agreement was unambiguous: 
Steinfeldt agreed on price and timing as clear new terms. There was no 
ambiguity to the agreement. 
The cases Steinfeldt cites from Colorado and Oregon do not change 
this conclusion. See Racrsdale Bros. Roofing v. United Bank, 744 P. 2d 
750, 754-55 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Harris v. Dver, 623 P.2d 662, 665 
(Or. Ct. App. 1981). Accepting arguendo these authorities as binding 
on Utah courts, they do not help Steinfeldt. Harris is illustrative. 
That court held that an arbitration clause could not constitute an 
express waiver because liquidating the debt (the task of arbitration) 
was not the same as collecting it (the task of a lien) . Thus, agreeing 
to arbitration does not mean one waives the ways in which to enforce 
the arbiter's judgment. Here, Steinfeldt agreed in the August 9 
contract to a specific date to fix Jboth the amount due him and the time 
when he could collect that amount. Because the agreement constitutes 
a temporary forbearance of the right to record a mechanics' lien, it is 
an express waiver of the right to record the lien at the earliest 
moment that might be allowed under the statute. 
Steinfeldt seems to argue that for a waiver to be effective, it 
must spell out the applicable law of mechanic's liens, including the 
timing requirements of those liens. For the agreement here to be 
12 
Indeed, it is more sensible to speak of the August 9 agreement 
as a modification, and not a waiver, of Steinfeldt's rights. The 
ways in which one may modify one's rights to use or forebear from 
using the remedy of a mechanics' lien are not limited, just as the 
ways in which one may contract are not limited. See 53 Am. Jur. 2d 
Mechanics'' Liens § 334 (1970); see First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. C.N Zundel. 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979). This 
approach makes sense given that the court's ruling labeled the 
written agreement as a "limited" lien waiver. 
B. Steinfeldt Breached the Contract by Filing His Lien 
Prematurely. 
The timing requirements of the statute clearly contemplate a 
"window" in which liens can be filed. The window is defined on one 
side as the date of substantial completion, and on the other as the 
expiration of the 80 days. Were this not so, no one would argue 
whether work had been substantially completed, as that date would 
have little relevance: a contractor could walk off the job at any 
time and file his lien, whether there had been substantial 
completion or not. Steinfeldt argues that "[tjhere is no statutory 
prohibition that would restrain the laborer from filing a notice of 
unambiguous in the sense that Steinfeldt suggests, it would not only 
have had to say that payment was due at the time of closing, but also 
say something like "Now, you realize that the Utah code allows you to 
file a lien only when payment is due you, and that such time now means 
the closing (or, in any event the date of substantial completion) . So, 
you cannot file your lien until closing or substantial completion 
(which here are essentially the same), and you will be limited to the 
amount agreed upon." Requiring such surplusage is ludicrous and simply 
not necessary. 
13 
lien on the first day work is performed—long before the eighty 
(80) day period starts to run." Brief of the Appellant at 17. 
Steinfeldt is wrong: the statute would be self-contradictory 
without such a prohibition. The prohibition is implicit. The date 
of substantial completion commences the period in which a filing 
may occur. Interiors Contracting v. Smith, Halander & Smith 
Assocs, 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("A contract is 
'completed' and the 100-day filing period begins to run when the 
work has been 'substantially completed,' leaving only minor or 
trivial work to be accomplished, and 'has been accepted by the 
owner.'"); Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, 771 P. 2d 
1101, 1102 (Utah Ct. App.)("A general contractor must record a 
mechanic's lien within 100 days after completion of the 
contract."), cert, denied, 781 P.2d 878 (Utah 1989). 
When Steinfeldt filed his lien on the Reeves property, there 
had been no substantial completion of the construction for which he 
had been hired. The parties chose the day of closing as the day on 
which Steinfeldt would be paid. Their choice made sense, for even 
absent a contract, the day of closing is a convenient and reliable 
date for fixing substantial completion. Closing did not occur 
until after November 5, 1993. It violates common sense to suppose 
that Steinfeldt could decree the date of substantial completion as 
the date he quit working on the job: such would mean that the date 
of substantial completion means the date of breach. In any event, 
14 
Reeves had not accepted Steinfeldt's work before he filed the lien. 
His filing was therefore premature. 
C. The Lien Was Recorded Wrongfully Because It 
Overstated the Amount Due Steinfeldt. 
In arguing that he was justified in claiming more than the 
agreement allowed, Steinfeldt insists on ignoring the payment terms 
of the agreement. Steinfeldt obviously refuses to be bound by his 
contractual obligations. He has argued that the payment date did 
not apply to him. Next he disputes the amount owed him. The trial 
court did not condone this approach, and when crafting its remedy 
it held Steinfeldt to the contract. As noted before, the court 
deemed the agreement a "limited" waiver of Steinfeldt's right to 
file a lien, limited because it only proscribed the timing and 
amount of payment on which a lien could be predicated. Steinfeldt 
was bound by these contractual obligations in addition to the safe 
harbor requirements of the mechanic's lien statute that he cites in 
his brief. Violating either the statutory or contract requirements 
constituted wrongful conduct, and the trial court so ruled. 
D. The Amended Filing Did Not Cure The Original Filing, 
and There Was no Acceptance by Reeves. 
For the same reason that the original filing was premature, 
the second "amendment" to the filing was invalid. Steinfeldt 
appears to contend that the amended filing in some way "cured" the 
defect of the original filing because the amendment took place 
after payment was due. This is not so, for several reasons. The 
amended lien still claimed an amount in excess of what was due. 
15 
Even were the amended lien not excessive and based on the parties' 
binding understanding, there is no authority that a wrongfully 
filed lien can be "cured" in such a manner. Under a plain reading 
of the statute, the wrongfully filed lien must be withdrawn, and a 
new lien filed in full accordance with the statute. Furthermore, 
"curing" the lien, even if this were possible, does not remedy the 
damages suffered by the Reeves in having to deal with the 
wrongfully filed lien of November 5, 1993. Steinfeldt's post hoc 
attempt to cure the lien cannot insulate him from damages arising 
from the original slanderous filing. Lastly, the threshold 
requirement that the Reeves accept Steinfeldt's work, Interiors 
Contracting v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs, 827 P.2d 963, 965 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), had still not been fulfilled at the time of 
the amendment, and therefore the period for filing had not yet 
begun. The amendment cured nothing. 
III. Steinfeldt Is Not Entitled to Prejudgment Interest. 
Steinfeldt claims prejudgment interest on the amount due him. 
Beyond a general prayer for "interest" in his Counterclaim 
(Appendix 6) , Steinfeldt never raised the issue of prejudgment 
interest with the district court, neither at trial nor in his 
motion for reconsideration. This issue should be disregarded 
because it was waived. 
Even were the issue validly before this Court, 
[t]he law on this issue is clear: M,[W]here the damage is 
complete and the amount of loss is fixed as of a 
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts 
and figures, interest should be allowed from that time . 
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. . and not from the date of judgment. on the other 
hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy, such as in the 
case of personal injury, wrongful death, defamation of 
character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the 
damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of 
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest 
is not allowed.'" 
Cornia v. Wilcox, 267 U.A.R. 40, 44 (Utah June 28, 1995)(quoting 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 
1989) (quoting First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 
P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982))). 
In Cornia the court denied prejudgment interest when the 
factfinder was charged with using "its best judgment in 
ascertaining and assessing the damages." Id. That is what Judge 
Harding did here with respect to Steinfeldt's damages. The amount 
due Steinfeldt was disputed. The origin of the dispute centered on 
whether Steinfeldt had completed the job, and so it was disputed 
whether the entire $10,000 fee enumerated in the contract was due. 
R. 339-40, 398-99. Other disputed figures included the number of 
supervisory hours to be charged, R. 335-36, 338, 339-40, 398-99, 
and what expenses were compensable. R. 3 3 9-40. Judge Harding's 
Findings of Fact specifically addressed and resolved these 
disputes. R. 263 (Finding 12). 
IV. Steinfeldt Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees. 
Steinfeldt argues that he is entitled to attorney fees under 
the statute. He is wrong. Steinfeldt is only entitled to fees if 
he is a successful party in an action to enforce a mechanics' lien. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. Steinfeldt has not been granted the 
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right to foreclose on his lien, nor has he been awarded any 
damages. The only reason he is still a creditor of Reeves is that 
their damages did not completely swallow up the debt they owed to 
him. The district court expressly found that Reeves were the 
prevailing parties, and that they were entitled to "deduct" from 
their debt to Steinfeldt their damages and attorney fees. R. 2 61-
63. The award of attorney fees to Reeves as a defending successful 
party was permissible under the statute. Palombi v. D & C 
Builders, 452 P.2d 325 (Utah 1969); see also Mountain States 
Broadcastincr Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)(there is usually only one prevailing party when a "prevailing 
party" is entitled to attorney fees). The district court awarded 
nothing to Steinfeldt, and by no means can the outstanding debt to 
Steinfeldt be considered a judgment for purposes of the statute: it 
was merely an outstanding debt against which Reeves' judgment was 
a setoff. Indeed, Steinfeldt has failed to attack the district 
court's discretion in awarding fees to Reeves (in his brief and 
docketing statement he does not cite abuse of discretion as the 
applicable standard of review), and instead chooses to quarrel with 
the district court's interpretation of the statute in arguing that 
the statute contemplates there being two prevailing parties. As 
noted, such a statutory interpretation is clearly wrong. The award 
to the Reeves—and lack of award to Steinfeldt—was proper and 
ought to be upheld. 
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CROSS-APPEAL 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is a contested issue in this cross-appeal, and is 
addressed in the argument. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does this court have jurisdiction over this cross-appeal 
because the final order was not issued in the trial court until 
January 3, 1995, and the notice of cross-appeal was filed January 
11, 1995, within the time period prescribed for filing a notice of 
appeal or cross-appeal? 
There is no standard of review applicable to this issue, since 
this Court originally reviews its own jurisdiction. 
2. Did the court clearly err when it awarded as the "cost of 
escrowing monies for lien" only $403, when the evidence adduced at 
trial shows "cost of escrowing monies for lien" to be over $2,000, 
and there is no basis in the record whatsoever for an award of $4 03 
for this category of damages. 
Questions of damages are inherently factual, and can only be 
reversed by an appellate panel if clearly erroneous. U.R.C.P. 
52(a). 
3. Is it clear error if a court fails to award damages for 
the delay in closing due to conduct determined to be wrongful when 
the evidence of such damages was uncontroverted? 
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Questions of damages are inherently factual, and can only be 
reversed by an appellate panel if clearly erroneous. U.R.C.P. 
52(a). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 (attached as Appendix 1). 
There are no other rules or statutes determinative of the cross-
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
As a threshold matter, the jurisdiction of this court over 
this cross-appeal is at issue. As for the substance of the cross-
appeal, a verdict was entered in favor of Reeves, and they now 
contest the propriety of the damage award. 
B. Proceedings Below. 
The case was tried to the bench, and the trial court ruled on 
liability and damages in favor of Reeves. Reeves now contest the 
damage award. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The procedural facts relevant to the jurisdictional issue have 
already been stated in the body of the response brief. As for the 
substance of the cross-appeal, the relevant facts concern the 
damages awarded by the trial court. At the conclusion of the 
trial, the trial court awarded Reeves the following damages: 
Cost of Finishing Construction $1,100.00 
Cost of escrowing monies for lien $403.00 
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Attorneys Fees $6,242.50 
(R. 263). 
The category of "Cost of escrowing monies for lien" states an 
award of $403. Evidence presented at trial indicates that such 
charges actually amounted to $1,842.20. Reeves introduced evidence 
that the delay in closing the long-term financing caused by 
defendant's conduct which the court found to be wrongful was $403 
(the difference between the construction loan interest and the 
long-term loan interest during the period of delay in closing). 
That category of damages was not included in the trial court's 
decision and judgment. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. There were a number of objections and motions filed below 
after trial. These were timed such that a final disposition in 
this case was not entered until January 3, 1995. Because Reeves 
filed their notice of cross-appeal on January, 11, 1995, they were 
well within any relevant window for filing such notice. Their 
cross-appeal should be heard, and if the appeal is dismissed, the 
cross-appeal should be heard as an appeal. 
II. The trial court awarded $403 in damages as the cost of 
escrowing money to cover the wrongfully filed lien. There is no 
basis whatsoever in the record for this award, as the evidence 
adduced indicates a sum of $1,842.20 for these damages. 
III. Evidence was presented that Reeves suffered $403 in 
damages for the 10-day delay in closing caused by the wrongfully-
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filed lien. The court did not award these damages, despite the 
fact that the evidence supporting them was uncontroverted. This 
was clear error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court has Jurisdiction Over Reeves' Cross-Appeal. 
This Court raised its jurisdiction over Reeves' cross-appeal 
sua sponte, and dismissed the cross-appeal on the grounds that the 
notice of cross-appeal was not filed within ten days of the 
December 27 notice of appeal. The Court has now opted to revisit 
the issue and allow it to be fully briefed, given the chronology of 
the post-trial motions discussed above. Given that chronology, a 
final order disposing of this case was not filed until January 3, 
1995. That means that the period for filing a cross-appeal 
(accepting that a valid notice of appeal was filed) began to run on 
January 3, 1995. U.R.A.P. 4(d)("[A]ny other party may file a 
notice of appeal . . . within the time otherwise prescribed by 
paragraph (a) of this rule . . . . " ) . The notice of cross-appeal 
was filed on January 11, well within the time limit for filing a 
notice of appeal or cross-appeal. Thus, the notice of cross-appeal 
should be deemed timely and the cross-appeal reinstated, and, if 
the appeal is dismissed, the cross-appeal should be treated as an 
appeal. 
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II. The Trial Court's Award of $403 in Damages for Cost of 
Escrowing Money Should Have Been an Award for the Delay in 
Closing, and $1842.20 Should Have Been the Award for Cost of 
Escrowing Money. 
When challenging a factual finding, an appellant is required 
to marshal all of the evidence at all relevant to the issue 
challenged, including evidence contrary to the appellant's 
position. In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
The evidence relevant to the issue of damages for escrow costs and 
closing delay concerned the amount the Reeves were required to 
escrow, the amount of interest charged the Reeves for setting that 
money into escrow, and the amount of excess interest incurred 
because of the closing delay. The portions of the record 
concerning these damages follow: 
1. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Notice of Lien. 
2. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. Amended Notice of Lien. 
3. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7. This indemnity agreement 
between Reeves and Steinfeldt provides that no liens will encumber 
the house at closing. 
4. Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. This is an Escrow Agreement 
providing that the Reeves are to deposit $26,893.50 into escrow 
with Security Title and Abstract. The escrow was required because 
of the presence of the lien on the Reeves property. 
5. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9. This Settlement Statement 
reflects the escrow amount as item 109. 
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6. Plaintiff's Exhibit 10. This check in the amount of 
$7,747.22 was issued to Reeves after Steinfeldt reduced his claim 
in the "amended" lien. 
7. Plaintiff's Exhibit 20. These cash advance receipts 
reflect the source of a portion of the escrowed monies. Reeves 
borrowed the money to produce the escrowed funds. 
8. Examination of Julie Reeves (R. 346-350, 358-359). 
Abstracted: presence of lien required more time with and trips to 
title company and bank; required escrowing 1.5 times lien amount 
(foundation for Exhibits 8, 9, 7,); $16,500 was borrowed from 
Security Pacific, and remainder was borrowed from Reeves' business 
(foundation for Exhibit 20). 
9. Examination of Shawn Reeves (R. 396-398). 
Abstracted: amount of finance charges on borrowed escrow monies was 
$1842.20. The amount $403 was finance charge for delay in closing. 
10. Closing Argument of Reeves (R. 516-517). 
11. Closing Argument of Steinfeldt (R. 528). 
The evidence clearly shows that the amount claimed as interest 
on the escrowed monies was $1,842.20, not $403. The $403 was the 
amount of damages incurred for the delay in closing. The testimony 
concerning the $403 amount and the $1,842.20 was close in 
proximity: that proximity may have been the cause of the trial 
court's confusion of the amounts. The fact remains, however, that 
the court awarded the incorrect amount as interest on the escrowed 
monies. The error is not only clear: it is obvious and easily 
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explicable. For this reason the Court should vacate the $4 03 award 
and remand to the trial court, instructing it to award the Reeves 
$1,842.2 0 as damages for escrowing the money in question.5 
Likewise, the trial court should have awarded the $403 in a 
separate category "damages caused by delayed closing". The remand 
should therefore also include an instruction to the trial court to 
award such damages, evidence of which was completely 
uncontroverted. 
CONCLUSION 
Steinfeldt's appeal should not be before this Court. He filed 
his notice of appeal prematurely, committing an error fatal to this 
Court's jurisdiction. If he is properly before the Court, then his 
appeal has no merit. He filed a mechanic's lien before the 
statutorily-prescribed window created for doing so. He claims he 
could file at any time, but in so arguing confuses the right to 
assert a claim with the statutory prescription of the right to file 
a lien. He contractually bound himself as to the amount of his 
claim and when he could assert that claim in the form of a lien. 
5
 The figure $1,842.20 was undisputed at trial. At the time of 
trial the interest on the escrow money was still accruing, as the lien 
had not yet been released. There would be a variety of ways to compute 
the interest on the $16,500 in question, including the most obvious 
method of using the interest rates quoted on the Security Pacific 
statements (Exhibit 20) . One could also use the statutory rate. Given 
that there was no evidence as to the method of computation, however, 
and the fact that the $1,842.20 figure was uncontested, that figure was 
the sole evidence of the amount of interest due and should have been 
accepted as such. To figure other amounts using various computation 
methods (or to try to discern the origin of the $1,842.20) would be 
mere speculation. 
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The closing date was fixed as the time for payment, and that date 
was also the time of substantial completion for purposes of 
commencing the filing window. His filing was premature and 
excessive, and caused Reeves substantial damages. His subsequent 
filing did not constitute a cure of the original, as there is no 
authority for such a "cure" and, in any event, Reeves had not 
accepted his work at the time of the amended filing. 
Reeves cross-appeal is properly before this court because of 
the timing of the post-trial motions filed below, and should be 
treated as an appeal should Steinfeldt's appeal be dismissed. The 
Reeves damages were unduly diminished by the trial court when it 
awarded them only $403 for the cost of escrowing money to cover the 
lien and failed to award anything under the category of damages 
caused by delayed closing. No evidence below supported such a 
finding, the only amount adduced being $1,842.20 for cost of 
escrowed money and $403 for delayed closing. That is the amount 
the Reeves should receive in addition to the other damages properly 
awarded them. 
DATED this 15th day of August/v1995. 
rSJlBER'EO D. DAVID EAM RXjand 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following this 15th 
day of August, 1995. 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
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APPENDIX 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 
407 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 4 
son might appeal as matter of right. Jensen v. an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg-
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). aient for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Man-
Order denying a motion for summary judg- ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State 
ment was not a final order and was not appeal- Tax Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 
A summary judgment in favor of one defen- (Utah 1986). 
dant alone is not a final judgment where the An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
action against the remaining defendant re- tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State 
mains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
1306 (Utah 1983).
 C i t e d ^ H u s t o n v L e w i 8 | 8 1 8 p 2d 5 3 1 
Unsigned minute entry. (Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
A.L.R.4th 939. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter .: right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 3hall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b;; vi.> -inder Ruie 32(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall rim from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
t?~ ~riw^  ocurt sh".1.! be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph ia) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the ::*:al court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
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No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Nielson v. Gurley, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Filing of notice. 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal. 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there was 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a 
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile 
court, and the original was returned to appel-
lant's counsel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Final order or judgment. 
Where the trial court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg-
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken 
from either is premature because the judg-
ments are not properly "final." Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights as parental custodian. State, In re 
T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. Appj, cert, de-
nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment, 
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts 
to run on the date when the trial court enters 
its first signed order denying the motion. 
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1990). 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative actions. 
Attorney fees. 
Cross-appeal. 
Extension of time to appeal. 
—Amendment or modification of judgment. 
Filing of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. 
Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Premature notice. 
Reconsideration of order. 
Timeliness of notice. 
—Date of notice. 
Cited. 
Administrative actions. 
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for 
review of administrative actions. Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Attorney fees. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Cross-appeal. 
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of 
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-ap-
peal, a respondent may not attack the judg-
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti 
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided 
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4). 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the 
court power to extend a time limit where a fail-
ure to act in time is due to excusable neglect 
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., autho-
rizing the court to relieve from final judgment 
for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies 
where a notice of appeal has not been timely 
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 
P.2d 843 (1970). 
A party could not extend the time for filing 
an appeal simply by filing a ''Motion for Recon-
sideration of Order Striking Petition and Mo-
tion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. 
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
When the question of "excusable neglect" 
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to 
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard con-
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the law-
yer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situa-
tions only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
. he time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional 
a^u ordinarily cannot be 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
—Amendment or modification of judg-
ment 
If an amendment or modification does not 
change the substance or character of a judg-
ment, it does not enlarge the time for appeal. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Where a post-judgment motion was timely 
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the 
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judg-
ment were filed after the motion was made, but 
before the disposition of the motion, the motion 
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and 
notice of appeal had to be filed within the re-
quired time from the date of the entry that 
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Ray, 658 
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). 
The time for appeal of an order corifirming 
an arbitrator's award runs from the order 
denying appellant's timely motion to alter or 
amend that judgment under Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1983). 
71.~ Supreme Court may not consider an ap-
~~-' "om the di;missal of a complaint for 
unpaid overtime compensation until the trial 
court has had an opportunity to review the or-
der in question by ruling on all pending post-
judgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 
694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984). 
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition 
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
